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Intelligence Reform Essay Brief Background The aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy has caused the US Federal Government to re-assess the setback and possible flaws of their homeland security defense. To primarily focus on investigating the tragedy, in November 27th 2002, the US Congress and President Bush commissioned a ten-man panel that comprised the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, which is known as the 9/11 Commission.   The 9/11 Commission expedited the investigation process and came up with a two-pronged framework based on the assessment. This two-pronged framework consists of the framing of action at a global perspective and the formulation of action at the domestic domain. The homeland security aspect has been emphasized and related by the 9/11 Commission with strong urgency for implementation and recommended it to Congress and the President. In addition, the commission also suggested the enactment of immediate measures that deal with the intelligence and enforcement agencies and the military organizations. Moreover, the US government has enacted several inter-agency programs that are highly supported by Congress and President Bush. Thus, the nationalization of homeland strategic programs has formally resulted in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) on January 20th 2004. In this regard, this paper will discuss the intelligence components of the IRTPA and measure its performance throughout the intelligence community while comparing it with the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. On these bases, a conclusive evaluation will discuss the impact of IRTPA to reform the national intelligence community. An Update Briefer This update briefer is used to keep abreast with the situation of the intelligence reform in retrospect of the discussion throughout this paper. The paper will also form relevance to the background of concerns affecting the IRTPA. Basically, according to critics, â€Å"the Bush administration is in its seven years of intelligence fiasco which controls more than 80% of America’s $60 billion intelligence budget—reflective of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ streamlining the Pentagon’s trail on national security policy and intelligence as he work hand in hand with Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Michael McConnell—he gradually assert civilian control over the key spy agencies funded by the defense budget and held Pentagon’s effort to create its own intelligence machinery independent of the CIA† . This criticism could somehow be founded on the discretion of the President and put into perspective the 9/11 Commission Recommendation No.13.2 which states that: â€Å"the current position of Director of Central Intelligence (DNI) should be replaced by a National Intelligence Director (NID) with two main areas of responsibility; (1) to oversee national intelligence centers on specific subjects of interest across the U.S. government and (2) to manage the national intelligence program and oversee the agencies that contribute to it† . At hindsight, the intelligence fund may have lead to criticism because the teaming up of Pentagon with the CIA requires substantial budget allocation primarily due to the realignment of budget appropriation to intelligence activities. The Framing of Global Strategy This section of the paper will discuss the 9/11 Commission’s framing of global strategy that defines the action of security measures at international perspective, as follows: Reflection on Generational Challenge The 9/11 Commission has determined and defined the conceptual framework of knowing their enemies by familiarizing the historical origin and doctrines that instilled in their adversaries desires to wage war against America. Basically, familiarizing with the enemy is also familiarizing with the combative measures used in defining or assessing the formidable threat. It was found that terrorism is not only an act of vengeance to kill and destroy but is also based on the doctrines of Islamist secessionism which means that the allied forces and not only America is at risk of terrorist attacks. In this regard, familiarizing with enemy requires the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense. By reflecting on the situation and knowing the enemies, the challenge lies on the achievable tactical and strategically managed plan of action for short and long term implementation. Attacking terrorists and their organizations The collaborative diplomatic ties with allied governments focuses on a campaign to thwart the terrorist attacks by means of information exchange and expanding the open-source of intelligence information, intensifying military operations and sharing of financial resources to allied government’s counter-terrorism programs.   The conduct of war on terrorism has been installed at all frontiers of defense ranging from domestic and international boundaries. The strategy being employed is to know better the enemies but more on identifying the perpetrators of terrorism. The coercive action in condemning the so-called â€Å"cowardice attack to US soil† has been proven in the fall of Baghdad and the capturing of Iraqi tyrant Saddam Hussein, a close ally of al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden. The war on terrorism is treated with broadened understanding by the 9/11 Commission. Preventing the Continued Growth of Islamist Terrorism According to former US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld , the battle of ideas is between the question of enforcing law to prevent terrorist attacks and the question of just merely killing them the moment they commit the crime. Capturing terrorists, whether they are suspected or proven otherwise, would strategically achieve security defense. In addition, isolating the enemy and putting them into peripheries is another tactical form of beating them.   In contrast to Rumsfeld’s claim, the 9/11 Commission has tackled the importance of the UN’s declaration of human rights and some principles on Articles of War of the Geneva Convention. It briefly explains the humane treatment of the enemy of the state even when they are captured in combat zones—as mostly terrorist prefer to hide in strife-torn areas—or at the actual scene of the crime which are non-combat zones and urban population areas. In a way, the act of capturing an enemy is employed with strategic treatment and debriefing on the circumstance of indoctrination, specifically to familiarize with the Islamic doctrines in a tactical aspect. At a glance, it is a minimal gain to extract information from a captured terrorist because most of them are suicidal and would rather bring with them to their grave the classified information they know or possess. In relation to adopt more sustainable strategies at the global perspective, a 6-point framework is as follows: 1. Turning a national strategy into a coalition strategy refers to fostering a broader alliance in various governmental representation from its domestic or homeland relations to international cooperation; 2. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction refers to supporting the call of the UN Security Council to all members and all allied states to disarmament of lethal weaponry that may result a genocide of the human race; 3. Strengthen counter proliferation efforts refers to act on counter-measures for countries that condone the exchange of lethal weaponry or weapons of mass destruction; 4. Expand the proliferation security initiative refers to expanding the open-source information in aid of intelligence access and exchange; 5. Support the cooperative threat reduction program refers to the retrieval of potentially useable weaponry or armaments that has been stockpiled during the war—which may be availably used by terrorists; 6. Targeting terrorist money refers to acting on financial embargo or halting the financial flow on the nature of funds that is being used by terrorists in funding their terrorist activities. Protection and preparation for terrorist attacks The continuing assessment and monitoring of potential threats of terrorist attacks to US homeland in particular and international communities of allied governments in general are being put into heightened configuration of security measures. The stabilization of preparedness programs and protective laws on immigration would minimize the burdens of terrorist threats. The crossing of borders is employed with modernized technological facilities and physical security system that would limit the terrorist’s mobilization or in-and out-country deployment. Likewise, travel advisory reduces the vulnerability of citizens to plunge into hotspots or terrorist bailiwicks. Defending the Homeland The 9/11 Commission has formulated recommendations with encompassing urgent actions for the US government to consolidate and mobilize troops and agencies. The key functional agenda is patterned after the global strategy that tackled the US homeland defense system. The following are the recommendations based on â€Å"How to do it? A different Way of Organizing the Government† : Unity of Effort Across the Foreign-Domestic Divide The recommendation called for jointly undertaking action in the sourcing of integrated intelligence through the establishment of a National Counter-Terrorism Center which has a mandate that resembles the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. The NCTC manages the joint operational and intelligence activities. Unity of Effort in the Intelligence Community Streamlining the flow of intelligence by organizing the key positions of authority, in which a National Intelligence Director manages the joint operational and intelligence centers, replacing the CIA’s Director of Central Intelligence. Unity of effort in Sharing Information The President’s mandate is called for unifying the functions of the government through mobilizing all governmental agencies to engage in information gathering and international cooperation with allied governments for information sharing. Unity of Effort in the Congress This calls for the establishment of a fully functional Congressional body that creates strong security policies and strengthens the homeland security. The unity of effort in Congress creates a policy structure that addresses the judicial and legal processes of security measures that manifests the sovereign interest of the people. Organizing America’s Defenses in the United States Institutionalizing the framework of intelligence—aside from the existing intelligence agencies—through a unified and managed specialty agency that is mandated to specifically organize the homeland defense basically results in the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. Transforming the Intelligence Work and Issues on Reforms In January 20th 2004, the US Congress enacted the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). The primary purpose of IRTPA is to reform the intelligence community and the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government . The transformation of intelligence work has found relevance in the enactment of IRTPA, in which the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has worked closely in the framing of the IRTPA as a law. According to ODNI, â€Å"a great structural change has occurred in the passing of IRTPA† . Stressing on the structural change, the ODNI has reformed its capabilities in managing the flow of human intelligence (HUMINT) as their open-source of information. Reforming the capabilities also enabled the optimization of both human and financial resources in managing the operations. The reform in the ODNI has substantially addressed the key operational issues affecting the intelligence community and is abl e to put into perspective the intelligence work on counter-terrorism, in order to fully manage the homeland defense system. In a Senate inquiry on the progress of intelligence reform in January 23rd 2007, the ODNI was inquired with several issues. First, they were asked about the agency performance in which Sen. John Warner pointed out â€Å"the progress thus far achieved by ODNI is ten percent† . Second, they were questioned on the effectiveness of managing the clandestine operation of the CIA using the HUMINT (human intelligence) in information sharing from open-sources, which apparently still need more refinements from the point of view of organizational management. Furthermore, the performance of the ODNI, as it reported its achievements, has shown defects in its organizational aspect. Due to these defects, the Senate inquiry hinted on an organizational review and suggested the recall of the clandestine operation as further inquired on the assurance of the best intelligence from the Iraq Study Group (ISG), which have achieved tactical and strategic intelligence. The conclusion of the Senate inquiry presumed on the issue of reform, which does not manifest in the ODNI’s organizational capability to benchmark the achievements of goals and the CIA’s clandestine work. A brief review of the literature shows that the ODNI may have been in the stage of adaptability to the structural change embodied in its organizational mandate by virtue of the IRTPA. Another consideration is the underlying performance of the ODNI in streamlining its goals which has affected the benchmarking of short and long term operational plans in the field and which has merely given due management by the CIA in its clandestine operation in using the HUMINT. At this point, the reform in intelligence community work was supposed to be measured by the expected assertiveness of the ODNI—as the 9/11 Commission recommended that the ODNI be designated as the agency that implements joint operational and joint intelligence work and replace some aspect of intelligence work of the CIA. Retrieval of Operation to Manifest Reform In an effort to fully address the key issues to manifest reform in the structural change brought about by IRTPA and legislative pressures, the retrieval of operation in the organizational function of ODNI has been resolved by the US Senate through the approval of the Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Act which â€Å"would emanate a more aggressive role to the ODNI in coordinating with the intelligence community† . The Senate Bill has surpassed the ODNI’s will of authority and retrieval of its operation that is being realigned to fully act on its function as a frontline agency in executing its mandate given by IRTPA. The degree and scope of authority of the ODNI is then expected to ventilate the reform in the intelligence community so as to re-examine the burdens and defects of work ranging from ministerial execution to field implementation. Moreover, an added feature that empowers the ODNI is the streamlining of bureaucracy in the formulation and execution of operating plans. Basically, reducing the involved authorities may expedite and resolutely implement the overall function and coverage of intelligence work. Likewise, the ODNI has been given the authority to appropriate budget thereby earmarking the fund for its National Intelligence Program. It would then be up to the ODNI to utilize and mobilize the resources that would be used to reform in the intelligence community. Conclusion The determination and identification of the 9/11 Commission for a global strategy has basically created the framework for the US homeland defense system. On the other hand, the recommendations have strongly moved the US government’s Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary branches which have enacted the IRTPA of 2004. In addition, the ODNI, as the body acting on intelligence mobilization, would require substantial budget allocation. Analyzing the enactment of IRTPA may be likened to a sword and an armor in which the bearer is the ODNI. In this regard, it can then be said that the US government has created an executioner of war on terrorism. Moreover, the degree and scope of authority vested upon the ODNI may be perceived as an ultimate implementer of capturing the world’s update. However, in some degrees, the reform in intelligence community may be burdened by domestic resistance from figures belonging to allied governments that oppose US foreign policy. Generally, the reform that was achieved by the US homeland defense system is the consolidation of its intelligence enforcement agencies and mobilization of its resources and strategies towards global perspective. The re-structuring of intelligence framework may be described as an art of war or a one-step backward, two-step forward move, which pursues the enemy outside its homeland while minimizing casualties. With this perception, the war on terrorism has been brought to the backyard of allied governments. It may be additionally perceived at the militarist point of view that the reform in intelligence community could reduce the expense of war in order to achieve the socio-economic-political gains from the war zones. Bibliography Donald Rumsfeld Interview on Jan. 30, 2004. Bremer-Sonnenberg Commission on Terrorism; in 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 12, Page 374. (2004) ISBN 0-16- 072304-3. IRTPA of 2004. â€Å"Introductory Page†. 108th Congress of US, Second Session, 20 January 2004. http://www.asksam.com/ebooks/intelReformAct/. (accessed 01 March 2008). Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) 2007. â€Å"Progress on Intelligence Reform to Senate Select Committee on Intelligence†. Transcript: Progress on Intelligence Reform. http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20070123_transcript.pdf. (accessed 01 March 2008). Richard A. Best Jr. and Alfred Cumming, 2007. â€Å"Director of National Intelligence Statutory Authorities: Status and Proposals,† CRS Report to Congress, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34231.pdf. (accessed 01 March 2008). Tim Shorrock. â€Å"Revisiting Intelligence Reform†, Foreign Policy in Focus, 6 December 2007. http://www.fpif.org (accessed 01 March 2008). US Senate Inquiry, 2007. â€Å"Statement for the Record by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence†. http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20070123_testimony.pdf. (accessed 01 March 2008). 9/11 Commission Report. â€Å"How to do it? A different Way of Organizing the Government†. Chapter 13, Page 399-428. (2004) ISBN 0-16-072304-3. 9/11 Commission Report. â€Å"Unity of Effort in the Intelligence Community†. Recommendation No. 13.2. Chapter 13, Page 407-415. (2004) ISBN 0-16-072304-3. 9/11 Commission Report. â€Å"What To Do? A Global Strategy†. Chapter 12, Page 361- 383. 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